



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

October 23, 1962

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

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The August, 1962, edition of the "Diplomatic List, published by the United States Department of State, lists Gennadi V. Gavrikov as a Third Secretary of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Washington, D. C. (I)

On October 23, 1962, a confidential source, who is an assistant to a member of Congress, advised a Special Agent on the Federal Bureau of Investigation that he had received telephone call from Gavrikov that afternoon indicating that Gavrikov, who has known the source for more than a year, wished to speak with him. They agreed to meet at a local hotel and did so at 6:00 p.m. on 10/23/62, where they dined together and talked for approximately one and a half hours.

Gavrikov stated that he had been working very hard during the day and had gone to Capitol Hill to make the rounds of his contacts, stopping to pick up papers at such places as the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Gavrikov's purpose, according to the source, was to sample Congressional sentiment towards President Kennedy's quarantine action against Cuba. Gavrikov concluded that Congress will back the President completely in this matter.

Gavrikov stated there had been a number of meetings at the Soviet Embassy on the morning of October 23, 1962, involving most of the employees. He did not go into any specifics about the nature of the meetings, but stated he had seen Soviet Ambassador Anatoli F. Dobrynin during the morning and he was "very grave." Gavrikov did not state what Dobrynin said about the tense situation, but remarked that the Ambassador had consulted with his "counsels" all day and more specifically with his military advisors. Gavrikov seemed very pessimistic and downhearted at what had been going on and remarked that things are now out of diplomatic hands and into military hands.

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Gavrikov remarked that he is the Congressional liaison man and was not included in these military consultations.

Gavrikov did make the following statements, however:

There are 22 Soviet ships en route to Cuba at the present time, with one due to arrive on the night of October 23 - 24, 1962. He said that the orders as of last night (October 22, 1962) were for the ships to continue to sail until stopped by force. He did not say what resistance would be offered, but indicated that if a 50 man crew was stopped by several hundred men, "What could they do?" He indicated the sailing orders may have been changed, but he does not know if this is so. He stated, however, that the Soviet Union cannot tolerate the boarding of one of their ships, as it would be too great a blow to its prestige. Gavrikov thinks that the Soviets do not have strong Naval forces in the area of Cuba, but again noted that this is really a military question.

Gavrikov does not think Soviet Premier Khrushchev can back down at this point because of "our hotheads" at home. As an example of what he meant by this, he stated, "If you sink one of our ships, our admirals will be so hot the pressure will make it impossible for Khrushchev to back down." He stated that if Khrushchev were to back down, he would be replaced by one of the new generation of younger, tougher and more aggressive leaders.

Gavrikov reminded the source that he had told him some months ago that a major decision had been made regarding Cuba. He now stated that the decision was made last May and apparently has resulted in the present installation of weapons in Cuba. Gavrikov stated he could not confirm the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba of his own knowledge. However, he suspects that if Moscow's statement on the situation on the morning of October 23, 1962, did not specifically deny it, then that would indicate they are probably there.

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Gavrikov criticized President Kennedy's blockade action, but added that Premier Khrushchev was "stupid" for sending weapons to the Cubans. The source told Gavrikov the President had proposed dismantling the weapons and hinted that failure to do so could result in Cuba being invaded. Gavrikov replied that Khrushchev could not tolerate this and such an invasion would mean retaliation in Iran, Turkey or Berlin. However, he emphasized that this was speculation on his own part. He stated that the only way to get the missiles out of Cuba would be to trade their removal for the withdrawal of Western missiles from, say, Turkey. He made the statement, "You might be able to get Cuba, but we'd get Europe."

The source said that while Gavrikov would not admit that Soviet missiles were in Cuba, he implied that he believed this to be true. He remarked that if nuclear warheads are in Cuba, they would be under strict Soviet control and not given to "bearded revolutionaries."

The source asked Gavrikov why Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had lied to the President when he said there were no offensive weapons in Cuba. Gavrikov replied that the weapons were defensive and that the only reason they would be there would be to strike back at the United States if it attacked Cuba. He stated that this parallels the presence of Western missiles in Turkey and pointed out that no one expects Turkey to attack the USSR. Gavrikov remarked that his wife is home in the USSR and expects a baby in November. He is concerned lest the present tension harm his wife. He stated that he helped his roommate pack today, as this roommate is returning to the USSR in two days. He stated that everyone in the Embassy wishes they were going with him and are afraid he will not be able to get a flight. The source described Gavrikov as extremely gloomy. He said he had never seen Gavrikov in such a pessimistic mood. The only hope that Gavrikov saw for a peaceful solution to the situation would be in delaying the confrontation of the Soviet ships by the blockade to give statesmen time to work out some alternatives.

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
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Gavrikov concluded by stating he was returning to the Soviet Embassy to attend a reception and told the source he would contact him later and extend him an invitation to the celebration of the anniversary of the October Revolution on November 7, 1962.

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Reference Memorandum dated and captioned
as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities
are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable
information in the past.

The source mentioned is in a position to furnish
reliable information, but contact with him has been limited
and his reliability has not been fully evaluated.



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